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Abstract. In the light of the recent fame of Blockchain technologies, numerous
proposals and projects aiming at better practical viability have emerged. How-
ever, formally assessing their particularities and benefits has proven to be a dif-
ficult task. The aim of this work is to compare the fundamental differences of
such protocols to understand how they lead to different practical performances.
To reach this goal, we undertake a complexity analysis of a wide range of promi-
nent distributed algorithms proposed for blockchain systems, under the lens of
Total Order Broadcast protocols. We sampled protocols designed for very differ-
ent settings and that use a broad range of techniques, thus giving a good overview
of the achievements of state-of-the-art techniques. By analyzing latency and net-
work usage, we are able to discuss each protocol’s characteristics and properties
in a consistent manner. One corollary result to our work is a more robust criteria
to classify protocols as permissioned or permissionless.
Keywords: Blockchain · Complexity Analysis · Asymptotic Performance · Dis-
tributed Computing · Permissionless · Permissioned
1 Introduction
Nakamoto’s famous work on Bitcoin [1] showed the potential for applications of Byzan-
tine agreement protocols. One of Bitcoin’s main achievements is being efficient at large
scale, such that the protocol stays practical even in the so-called permissionless setting,
i.e., when participation is open to anyone and not restricted. This contrasts with the
existing line of research for fault tolerant distributed systems that were mostly suited
for small-scale systems. Since Bitcoin, numerous propositions and publications from
both scholars and industrials emerged, ranging from proofs of concept, small improve-
ments to new full-fledged protocols supporting various environments such as large data
center or network of smart objects (aka Internet of Things) [2]. Many of these propo-
sitions are targeted toward improving performance in terms of confirmation time and
transactions per seconds. Indeed, these metrics are directly visible by the end users, and
Bitcoin is notoriously weak in those regards compared to others existing protocols such
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1.1 Motivation
Although progress has been made to understand how Bitcoin-like protocols relates to
existing research [4, 5], the contribution and relevance of each proposition is difficult to
compare and assess. Additionally, considering the highly competitive climate of cryp-
tocurrencies, the good faith of each authors’ description and evaluation may be ques-
tioned.
As a result, it is difficult for the users to draw a coherent view of the blockchain
ecosystem without making an exhaustive technological deep dive. Worse, each project’s
practical viability may greatly vary even across similar protocols, due to different im-
plementation, usage and context.
In order to shed some light on this issue, we start from the simple observation that
most blockchain protocols aim at implementing some variant of Total Order Broadcast
(TO Broadcast), also referred to as Atomic Broadcast. Informally, a TO Broadcast is a
protocol that allows processes to reliably broadcast messages, such that messages order
are agreed on by the whole network. Hence, we can readily use TO Broadcast as an
abstraction layer of the functionality offered by blockchain protocols, which allows for
a generic discussion on their properties. In particular, it will serve as a basis to define
common performance metrics.
This work will evaluate the efficiency of prominent blockchain protocols, when
seen as a way to implement TO broadcast. The aim of this paper is to compare each
protocol efficiency related to its network usage. As such, we will evaluate latency and
communication complexity as functions of network parameters. To better relate them
with Bitcoin, we will particularly focus on their scalability in terms of number of par-
ticipants. This helps us to better understand the different trade-offs adopted by existing
algorithms to reach their goals in terms of performance metrics that are relevant to the
end user.
1.2 Paper results
We have analyzed a wide range of algorithms: Bitcoin [1, 6], Snow White [7], Spec-
tre [8], Ouroboros [9], Algorand [10, 11], Tendermint [12] and HoneyBadgerBFT [13].
In this paper we were able to compare each algorithm through a generic frame-
work, by instantiating a few parameters describing each assumed model. Thus, these
protocols can be consistently analyzed and compared in terms of communication com-
plexity (overall number of bits sent through the network) and latency (the time it takes
for all correct nodes to deliver a broadcast message). This allows us to make a simple
but robust analysis that justifies the informal observations that have been made on these
algorithms. This can be useful, for instance, to determine the appropriate algorithm for
a given use case. Also, this work opens research opportunities for protocols achieving
yet unexplored latency/communication trade-offs, as well as the potential for interesting
impossibility results. Additionally, we are able to make a more robust argumentation on
deciding whether an algorithm can be deemed as suited for the permissionless setting,
i.e. its performances should scale with the number of participants.
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1.3 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the closest work to our is from Fitziet al. [14]. Like
us, they define performance-related metrics (namely, delay and throughput) that they
evaluate for several protocols. However the main focus of their work is a technique to
improve the performance of some blockchain protocols. As such, their tools are mostly
used to asses their proposal in regards to a few bitcoin-like protocols, and our analysis
is much more complete. Vukolic [15] gave a good informal overview on how Proof-of-
Work (PoW) and the classical BFT paradigm relates to performance/scalability trade-
offs, but only made high level observations without quantification. Although Cachin &
Vukolic´ [16] reviewed several algorithms, their work focus on resiliency and fault tol-
erance and not performance. Gervais et al. [17] analyzed how tuning the performance-
related parameters of PoW blockchains impacts their security. In contrast, we analyze
performance as a function of security parameters and network model. Dib et al. [18]
reviewed and compared the performance of several algorithms, but their work is focus
on the permissioned setting, and displays practical numbers for the end user rather than
asymptotic complexity. BLOCKBENCH [19] is a framework from Dinh et al. to eval-
uate the practical performance of blockchain implementations, that moreover targets
only the permissioned setting.
Otherwise, as it is standard practice, several works provide a complexity analysis
of their algorithms. However they cannot always be compared since they may be cal-
culated for different metrics, and under different models. In fact, a non negligible part
of our work was to cast (and check) the proper values into our framework. Moreover,
except for a few mentioned cases, the respective authors of the selected protocols made
only a partial complexity analysis, e.g. only for one of the metrics.
1.4 Paper Organization
This Paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we make a short description of the
concepts relevant to our analysis. In Section 3, we describe the adopted methodology in
terms of parameters and metrics used to make the evaluation. In Section 4, we detail the
network behavior of each protocol and give the steps leading to the results. In Section 5,
we give a short analysis of the results and motivate our arguments. Finally, we conclude
this paper in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Notations
We denote by negl(·) a negligible function, i.e. such that for every polynomial p,
∃κ0,∀κ > κ0,negl(κ) ≤
1
p(κ)
.With overwhelming probability is abbreviated w.o.p.| · |
is the size operator, i.e. the number of elements for a set, or the length for a tuple. We
use standard definition of Ω(·),Θ(·),O(·) notations for complexity, i.e. O( f (n)) is of
order at most f (n), Ω( f (n)) is of order at least f (n), Θ( f (n)) is of order exactly f (n).
We will further clarify their usage in our context in Subsection 3.2. We use the terms
protocol and distributed algorithm interchangeably.
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2.2 Definitions
A Total Order Broadcast protocol, also called Atomic Broadcast, is a distributed al-
gorithm that implements two primitives, TO-broadcast(m) and TO-deliver(m)
with m some message. We say that a process p TO-broadcast m when it executes
TO-broadcast(m), and that p TO-delivers m when it executes TO-deliver(m).
To be a Total Order Broadcast, the protocol has to satisfy the following properties [20]:
– Validity: If a correct process TO-broadcast a message m, then some correct process
eventually TO-delivers m.
– Agreement: If a correct process TO-delivers a message m, then all correct processes
eventually TO-delivers m.
– Integrity: If p is a correct process, then for every TO-delivery ofm by p, m has been
TO-broadcast.
– Total order: If two correct processes TO-deliver two messages m1 and m2, then
both processes TO-delivers the messages in the same order.
Such protocol can be used to implement State Machine Replication, although the
latter generally refer to a context were external clients sends commands to a network of
replicas, which are consistent states machines. However the differences are mostly re-
lated to application semantics, and thus both concepts have been used interchangeably.
The studied protocols does not all solve exactly the same problem. In particular,
they do not make the same assumptions about the underlying network model, and do not
achieve the same properties, although they are similar. To make a consistent analysis, as
mentioned earlier, we consider them all as Total Order Broadcast protocols.We consider
they implement the primitives To-Broadcast(m) and notify messages delivery by
calling TO-deliver(m). We will further specify how these primitives are mapped to
each protocol in order to solve total order Broadcast, and will make note on the model
variations adopted by each protocol. A notable difference specific to Bitcoin and PoW-
based algorithms is the weakening of the safety properties, which are only guaranteed
w.o.p., whereas more traditional algorithms may not even be probabilistic.
3 Methodology
This section first describe the common model adopted, through parameters that capture
the relevant assumptions made by all protocols. Then we explain how we related them
to the security parameter to make meaningful statements, and we finally define our
metrics.
3.1 Network Model
Common basis All protocols analyzed are based on the Interactive Turingmachines [21]
model. Further assumptions on the network are appropriately stated through additional
parameters that are given to each protocol at its instantiation. Other unrelated assump-
tions are not made explicit through this analysis. Each algorithmmay require additional
independent parameters that modify its behaviour.
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Fig. 1. Summary of parameters
n number of participants
∆ bound on network delays
α byzantine power
κ security parameter
More precisely, the protocols assume a set Π with |Π |= n of processes (also called
nodes) with asynchronous clocks that exchange messages through asynchronous reli-
able point-to-point channels. Asynchronousmeans that there is no bound on the number
of time steps taken for a message to be sent and received. Reliable means that no mes-
sages are dropped or modified. The communication graph is bidirectional and complete
i.e. any node can send a message to any node.
Additional Assumptions Next, we define a few more parameters that convey the addi-
tional assumptionsmade on the network model by the different algorithms. However the
reader should keep in mind that this does not fully capture all subtleties of the models
considered by each protocol.
Synchrony We denote by ∆ the maximum number of time steps taken by a message to
reach its destination. Strongly synchronous protocols require ∆ in their parameters, or a
bound thereof. Partially synchronous protocols, depending on how they are formulated,
either: require ∆ in their parameters, but will simply not terminate if the given value
is lower that ∆ , or not require it at all. For asynchronous protocols, ∆ is a unit for
asynchronous rounds defined as follow: Messages are assigned with a round number r
such that all r− 1 messages must be delivered before sending any r+ 1 message.
In any case, evaluating the performance is only relevant when the protocols termi-
nate, hence we will ignore messages schedules that prevent termination.
It should be noted that the nodes bandwidth is only indirectly taken into account:
the bounds on network delay are supposed to hold such that all messages can be fully
transmitted.
Byzantine faults [22] Furthermore, all protocols tolerate some level of byzantine fail-
ure, that is, nodes that behave arbitrarily. We say that a node is correct or honest if it
follows the protocol. Otherwise, we interchangeably use the terms malicious, faulty or
Byzantine. To do so, all algorithms need some sense of a sybil resistant resource i.e.,
a quantity that the adversary cannot artificially increase. This is translated by the as-
sumption that no more than a fraction α of the resource is owned by malicious nodes.
Therefore, we define a generic parameter α , which denotes the fractional byzantine
”power” owned by the adversary. More precisely, depending on each assumption:
– If there is at most t byzantine nodes in Π , then α = t
n
– If PoW is assumed, then α is the fraction of the total hashrate that byzantine node
can produce.
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– If nodes have stake, then α is the the fraction of the total stake that is owned by
byzantine nodes.
The reader should keep in mind that although the adversary power is modeled only
through a unique parameter, the practical means and difficulty to acquire a given α
is vastly different depending on the case considered above, e.g. it means something
completely different to control t specific computers rather than being able to produce
x hashrate. Moreover, further assumptions can be made to make the adversary more or
less powerful, especially regarding its capacity to dynamically corrupt nodes.
3.2 Security & protocol parameters
Moreover, all protocols require a parameter to tune the desired security level. This pa-
rameter will be treated separately in this paper, and hence will be specifically named κ .
Then, with overwhelming probabilitymeans with probability 1− negl(κ).
Then, note that the precise requirement for each protocol is of the form: ”for all
admissible model parameters n,∆ ,α , all stated properties holds with probability 1−
negl(κ)”.
However, this statement only deals with probability of failure when κ is varying and
the model parameters are fixed. As a result, all O(·) notations used to prove only refer
to κ and treat the model parameters as constants.
This is problematic for our purposes because we also want to express the perfor-
mance variation when the model parameters are varying (and in particular, n). Hence,
we cannot make the same usage of O(·) notations for our metrics5.
One solution could be forbid ourselves O(·) notations where the constants also
depends on some model parameter. However, it is common to have the performance
metrics depend on some complex variable which is shown to be O(κ), but its precise
dependencies to the protocol parameters are difficult to track, or even unknown.
As a result, we choose a middle ground where O(·) notations may still depend on
the model parameters, but we will note in subscript on which of them it does depend.
For instance, Ωα ,∆ (κ) is a variable of order at most κ , and that does not depend on n.
It should be noticed that this still hides bounded expressions of the model parame-
ters, for instance, we have that α = Oα(1) = O(1) because α is bounded by a constant
independent of α , namely, 1. In practice we will avoid such simplifications and keep
the subscript.
Interestingly, each protocol may not require to be instantiated with the same param-
eters for all nodes. This is the case for instance for κ in Bitcoin, where each node decide
how many confirmations are deemed secure. On the contrary, in Algorand κ has to be
uniquely chosen before the protocol starts.
Additional parameter Beyond the previous model parameters, each protocol can be
instantiated with additional protocol parameters. Since there will be at most one such
parameter relevant for our analysis for each protocol, we we will name it p in the fol-
lowing. This parameter is may be used to make efficiency and/or security trade-offs,
5 This would result mostly in O(κc) values, for some c≥ 0
Asymptotic Performance Analysis of Blockchain Protocols 7
or its optimal value may be unknown. Their precise meaning will be detailed in their
corresponding section.
3.3 Metrics
We analyze the standard metrics used to evaluate distributed algorithms efficiency: la-
tency and communication complexity. These are even more relevant in our context be-
cause they are directly experienced by the end user.
Latency is the number of time steps between a message TO-broadcast and its TO-
delivery by the last honest node. Note that, assuming synchrony, one round is ∆ time
steps. In the context of cryptocurrencies, it is directly the time the end user has to wait
before his transaction is effective.
Communication complexity is the amortized number of bits received by honest play-
ers for a message to be TO-delivered by all honest players. It should be noticed that
communication complexity is usually given in terms of overhead, but we take here the
total value, to give a sense of the network capacity required to run the protocol. This
metric will be given as a function of the total message size b. As a side effect, the use of
b allows informally to distinguish a ”constant overhead” cost, i.e. that occurs indepen-
dently of the data to broadcast, from an ”efficiency” cost which reflects the overhead
that scales with the amount of data transmitted. We also remark that, depending on the
algorithm, the bound on network delays ∆ may also cover messages of size b. Thus, in
practice, increasing b could in turn increase ∆ .
We will use the term confirmation time as a synonym to latency, and bit complexity
as a synonym to communication complexity.
4 Analysis
We now present our complexity results. This section is divided in three subsections,
corresponding to different kinds of algorithms and in fine analysis methodology. The
first subsection treats blockchain style algorithms through a common framework from
Garay et al. [6]. The second subsection evaluates protocols that follows the existing line
of research for Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) algorithms. The last subsection gathers
protocol that work differently from the others and required specific treatment.
4.1 Using the Bitcoin backbone protocol
For Bitcoin, SnowWhite, and Ouroboros we will rely on the backbone protocol formal-
ism from Garay et al. [6]. These protocols follows the classical blockchain approach,
where leaders periodically broadcast new blocks, resulting in a tree structure where a
common chain can (hopefully) be extracted. In Bitcoin, protocol participants are min-
ers.
Their goal is to satisfy three properties: kp-Common Prefix, (kg,τ)-Chain Growth
and (kq,µ)-Chain Quality, abbreviated CP, CG and CQ respectively. They can in turn
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be used to prove to prove k-Persistence and u-Liveness. As a side note, in the first
version of the backbone protocol [23], a weaker version of CP was considered which
did not allow for a black box reduction. Pass & Shi [24] further introduced an additional
property, future self-consistency, solving this issue. We refer here to the strong version
of CP, that includes future self-consistency, as in the cited version of the backbone
protocol. In this framework, k-Persistence and u-Liveness are properties of a Robust
Transaction Ledger, which implies State Machine Replication [25]. The k parameter is
the number of confirmations that a block must get to be committed, and u is the number
of round that a transaction takes before being committed.
Informally, CP states that pruning kp block from a chain results in a prefix that is
shared by all nodes. CG states that every kg consequent rounds each node adds at least
τ blocks, i.e. τ is a round/block conversion parameter. CQ states that in every chain
segment of length kq, there is at least a proportion µ of honest blocks. The proof for
persistence is straightforward from CP. However the proof for liveness yields a value
from the confirmation time as a function of the properties parameters, namely, u =
max(kg,
kq+kp
τ ).
We sketch the general idea of this proof here: After u≥ kg rounds, there are at least
τu new blocks in the honest players chain (CG). Therefore, if τu > kq + kp, after u
rounds, the honest players’ chain grew by at least kq + kp blocks. In this new chain,
the first segment of length kq is a common prefix to all honest players, because it is
kp blocks deep (CP). Moreover, there is at least kqµ ≥ 1 blocks in this segment that
are from honest players, which contains the transaction. Thus it is reported as stable
by all honest players. Therefore, if u ≥ kg and τu > kq+ kp, then the protocol satisfy
u-Liveness.
With foresight, we have that kq + kp will be a security parameter. Thus, we will
additionally detail their value depending on the model parameters.
For these protocols, the analysis regarding communication complexity is simpler:
Each block of size b is broadcast once, and subsequent required confirmations does not
change the amortized cost since each of them will (eventually) commit b additional bits.
The minimal communication cost is bn. Furthermore, this cost is only increased by or-
phaned blocks. However, the properties of a robust ledger alone does not allow to bound
the number of orphaned blocks. We observe that the three Bitcoin-Backbone based pro-
tocols satisfy an additional property: In kb rounds, there are at most kbτb blocks pro-
duced. Along with CG with τ > 0, this bounds the ratio of orphaned blocks by Θα(1).
Bitcoin [1]
For a baseline comparison, we start the analysis of Bitcoin. We build our analysis
on the work from Garay et al. [6], where they showed that Bitcoin satisfy the three
properties Common Prefix, Chain Quality and Chain Growth.
In this work the authors articulate their proofs on the assumption of a typical ex-
ecution, that roughly states that parties produce blocks at a rate close enough to their
expected value (i.e., hashpower). Then they show that any execution of k rounds is typ-
ical with probability 1− e−Θε(k), where ε is a variable that quantify how close to its
expected value is the block production. In turn, the proofs will rely on ε being ”not too
large”, which is implicitly assumed in the ”honest majority assumption”. This assump-
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tion gives a bound on ε that depends on α and ∆/p, where p is the expected block
creation time. Hence, an execution longer than Ωα ,∆/p(κ) rounds is typical w.o.p.
CP, CQ and CG are proven assuming a typical execution, with kp = kq ≥ 2k f and
τ = (1−ε) f for some variable f , hence we have u-Liveness with u≥ 4k
1−ε =Θα ,∆/p(κ).
Ouroboros [9]
Ouroboros is a strongly synchronous Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol. It is currently
implemented for cryptocurrency Cardano (https://www.cardano.org).
Ouroboros does not assume PoW, and consequently has to generate its own random-
ness for the leader election. This is done inductively by leveraging previous broadcast
to implement a common coin tossing. This part is somewhat complex but fortunately
our analysis is blind to its details. Moreover, it gives the useful property of having one
unique designated leader per round.
As a result, there is at most one block per round, and CP, CG and CQ can be proven
using solely properties of the distribution of honest and malicious leader in the block
tree. This is done through the analysis of characteristics strings, which are an encoding
of the schedule of honest and malicious leaders. Then they show that a string of length
k is forkable with probability negl(k). This is, of course, for an appropriate notion of
fork that is latter used to prove CP CQ and CG. In particular, since the distribution of
characteristics strings only depends on α , we have that k=Ωα(κ)Moreover, τ = 1−α ,
because there is at least one block for each round with an honest leader.
As with Bitcoin, strong synchrony is assumed, therefore the latency is ∆Ωα(κ)
Snow White [7]
Like Ouroboros, Snow White is a strongly synchronous protocol that does not as-
sume PoW. Its particularity however is its tolerance of honest nodes that do not show
up.
Snow White is able to cope with honest nodes being asleep, as long as there are
more awake honest nodes than malicious ones. In contrast, asleep honest nodes in Bit-
coin are counted as malicious, at least until they are implicitly dropped during difficulty
adjustment. In that sense SnowWhite tolerates stronger adversaries, because for α ma-
licious nodes, it requires only α honest ones and 1− 2α asleep ones instead of just
1−α honest nodes.
The notations used are slightly different, because all time-related values are directly
expressed in terms of number of time steps instead of number of rounds. As a result, the
Chain Growth τ parameter directly translate blocks to time steps, and we can simply
rely on kg+ kp being O(κ).
SnowWhite works somewhat similarly to Ouroboros, in the sense that it inductively
generates its own public randomness to elect leaders. However, each node has a fixed
probability p to be elected at each time step, instead of having unique leaders at each
round. The authors then prove Chain Growth with τ−1 = Oα ,np(1)+∆O(1). Roughly
speaking, the first term is the expected time it takes for an online node to find a block,
and the second one is the time for the block to be sent. Thus we have a total latency of
∆Ω(κ)+Ωα ,np(κ)
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4.2 Traditional BFT style algorithms
The following algorithms are more inspired from the existing literature on BFT consen-
sus algorithms, and share some common concepts that we outline here for convenience.
First, they all follow the framework of a per-block consensus instance, which is final
and essentially independent from the others. This instance is implemented as a proce-
dure that each node starts with its own input, and then the output is the next block to be
added.
These protocols often make use of simpler common primitives. One of them is Re-
liable BroadCast (abbreviated RBC), that let a designated sender to broadcast a value
such that honest nodes either agree on the value sent, or that the broadcast was unsuc-
cessful. Formally, a Reliable Broadcast protocol is exactly TO-Broadcast, without the
Total Order property [22].
Another primitive used is the Binary Agreement (abbreviated BA) primitive. In a
BA, each processor propose its own input value vi ∈ {0,1}, and deliver another value,
such that:
– Agreement: If a correct processes delivers a value v, then all correct processes de-
livers v.
– Validity: If a correct process delivers v, then v was proposed by a correct process.
– Termination: All correct processes eventually decides.
Tendermint [12]
Tendermint is a partially synchronous TO Broadcast algorithm, targeting high per-
formance in a small-scale permissioned setting.
Its normal case operation is reminiscent of PBFT [3], except that leaders are changed
at each command (i.e. block). For each block, there is a leader that will execute RBC
implemented through two all-to-all voting rounds. Of course, to optimize bandwidth,
only the hash of the block is included in the voting messages. This require the b bytes
of the batch to be sent to all n nodes, and then the Reliable Broadcast cost of n2 bytes,
taking three of communication steps. That is, in a fault-free execution, (bn+ n2)Θ(1)
bit complexity and ∆Θ(1) latency.
Note that Tendermint, as PBFT, is optimized for the normal case operation. How-
ever, since the leader is arbitrarily designated, it may be malicious. In this case, the
properties of the Reliable broadcast still ensure safety, but termination can be prevented.
This is why, after a timeout, it will be the turn of the next designated leader to proceed
for a new broadcast. The choice for the new leader being in a fixed round-robin order,
all αn=Θα(n)malicious nodes may be leaders first and delay the block commit by the
same factor. Therefore, the worst case communication cost is (bn2+n3)Θα(1) bits and
∆nΘα(1) latency.
HoneyBadgerBFT [13] HoneyBadgerBFT (abbreviated HBBFT) is an asynchronous
probabilistic algorithm that solves TO-broadcast.
It is built on the Asynchronous Common Subset (ACS) primitive. Informally, ACS
is used to agreed on a subset of the union of the nodes’ inputs. It is defined as fol-
low [13]:
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– Validity: If a correct node deliver a set v, then |v| ≥ (1−α)n and v contains the
inputs of at least (1− 2α)n correct nodes.
– Agreement: If a correct node deliver v, then every node deliver v.
– Termination: All correct nodes eventually delivers.
To prevent the adversary from selectively censoring transactions included in the out-
put set, HBBFT uses a threshold encryption scheme before broadcasting transactions.
The ACS is a reduction to Reliable Broadcast and binary Byzantine Agreement
from Ben-Or et al. [26]. Roughly, each node runs in parallel an instance of RBC, to
send their value. Then, for each RBC, there is a BA instance to agree whether it did
terminate. Then, the nodes outputs the union of RBC values for which its termination
has been agreed. To ensure the Validity property, the protocol has to ensure that at least
(1−α)n RBC instances terminated.
The RBC terminates in three rounds and has |m|nO(1)+n2log(n)O(κ) bit complex-
ity, with |m| the message size. The BA is an asynchronous probabilistic protocol with
n2O(κ) bit complexity. At each round it has 1/2 probability to terminate. As stated
above, HBBFT has to wait for (1−α)n = nΘα(1) parallel instances of them to termi-
nate, the time for this to happen is log(n)Oα(1) rounds.
However one of HBBFT achievements is that at the end of this procedure, it com-
mits data from all nodes input. That is, if all nodes have an input of size b, then the
batch committed will be of size nbΘ(1) bits. Hence, at each batch of size b committed,
there is O(1)bn+ n3log(n)O(κ) bits received by honest players.
Note that the authors do provide an analysis, but they state their results in terms of
overhead, i.e. the total cost divided by b. Furthermore, by specifying a batching policy
b= n2log(n)O(κ), they obtain the nO(1) figure which is a constant per-node overhead.
This emphasis on the low overhead is less visible in our results, although it is translated
by the fact that HBBFT complexity on the b factor is bn instead of bn2 for other BFT-
style protocols, i.e. a reduction factor of n consistent with the authors analysis.
4.3 Others Blockchain based algorithms
The two following protocols adopts significantly different paradigms, such that they are
treated separately.
Spectre [8]
Spectre is a PoW-based partially synchronous distributed algorithm aimed specifi-
cally at a cryptocurrency application.
In Spectre, the PoWmerely serves as a network-level synchronization primitive. As
such, there is little restriction on the mining process, and the mining hardness p is only
a protocol parameter for tuning network behavior. More precisely, the only assumption
regarding p is that blocks are produced less quickly that the nodes can receive them,
hence it is not related to κ .
The Spectre protocol maintains a public ledger that grows over time, and a sub-
protocol RobustTxO outputs the linearized log with the safety and liveness properties.
Once again, participants to the protocol are miners. A message is a transaction, and we
execute TO-Broadcast when including it in a block. A transaction is TO-Deliveredwhen
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it is output by RobustTxO. Then, under some conditions that we detail below, Spectre
is a (variant of a) TO Broadcast, because [8]: Proposition 5 (Safety) implies Agreement
and validity, Proposition 4 (Consistency) implies Total Order, and Proposition 6 (Weak
Liveness) implies Termination.
Because it is targeted for a cryptocurrency application, Spectre achieves a weaker
version of TO-Broadcast in two regards. First, the total order is weakened into a partial
order, meaning that the messages are only ordered if the application requires so. Sec-
ondly it has a weakened liveness property. Translated to the TO-Broadcast abstraction,
it means that Termination may not be satisfied under some conditions on the nodes’ in-
puts. This weakening is acceptable for Spectre because those conditions express nodes
honesty according to the application context, i.e. honest cryptocurrency users that never
try to double-spend will enjoy termination.
Roughly speaking, transactions are extracted from the blocks graph, and it is possi-
ble for each of them to compute whether their probability to be undone is greater than
a given ε . Then, the Ωα(κ) confirmations are still required, but since block creation is
more flexible, the δ is no longer a multiplicative factor but an additive overhead that
ensure a consistent view across all honest nodes.
More precisely, Spectre implements a procedure RiskAcceptTx that gives a bound
on the probability that safety will not hold for this transaction. The authors then show
than the bound returned is smaller than a given ε after log( 1ε )O(1) honest blocks are
created. However, since this procedure additionally require the node local values for
α and ∆ , we have that the number of honest blocks required is Oα ,∆ (κ). The time
taken for this to happen is obtained by multiplying it by 1(1−α)p = (pΘα(1))
−1. Then
for all nodes to be aware of these blocks an additional ∆ overhead is added, resulting in
∆O(1)+
Oα,∆ (κ)
p
latency.
Communication complexity on the other hand is simpler to analyze. In fact, the
analysis is similar to the one for others blockchain style algorithms. Since Spectre
selectively outputs transactions individually, the adversary only mean to increase the
communication complexity is to use all its hashpower to send invalid transactions, ef-
fectively increasing the amortized cost by a factor 1
1−α =Θα(1).
Algorand [10], [11]
Algorand is a strongly synchronous protocol with a per-block agreement approach.
Its byzantine agreement primitive vastly differs from traditional BFT algorithms. In
fact, like Ouroboros and SnowWhite, Algorand rely on a public randomness computed
in previous blocks. It is used to elect a committee (instead of a leader) at each round
that will have sufficiently many honest nodes, w.o.p. These committees run a byzantine
agreement which does not require a private state from the nodes (except from their
private key), since committees would not be able to pass it on to the next committee
properly. This property is called player replaceability by the authors. Except from this
property, common techniques from BFT algorithms can be used to reach agreement in a
constant number of rounds. In particular, since it has been ensured that committees have
a constant fraction of honest nodes, standard quorum-based arguments are still valid.
More precisely, at each round, each user has a fixed probability p to be part of
the committee. To bound the number of malicious nodes in a committee, the authors
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Table 1. Performance summary
Algorithm Latency Communication complexity
Nakamoto [6] ∆Θα ,∆/p(κ) bnΘα (1)
Ouroboros [9] ∆Ωα(κ) bnΘα (1)
SnowWhite [7] ∆Ω(κ)+Ωα ,np(κ) bnΘα (1)
Spectre [8] ∆O(1)+
Oα,∆ (κ)
p
bnΘα (1)
Algorand [10] ∆O(1) bnΘ(κ)+nΩα (κ)
Tendermint [12] ∆nΘα (1) (bn
2+n3)Θα (1)
HoneyBadgerBFT [13] ∆ log(n)Oα (1) bnO(1)+n
3log(n)O(κ)
leverage the fact that ∀β < α , the probability of having at most βk malicious nodes in
a uniformly sampled committee of size k is 1−negl(k). Thus, the committees expected
size is Ωα(κ).
As a result, each round that would be equivalent to a n2 all-to-all communication in
a traditional BFT algorithm is now a ”committee-to-all” nΩα(κ) communication.
To optimize bandwidth, Algorand still does some sort of leader election. More pre-
cisely, the expected committee size for the block proposers is the smallest such that
there is at least one proposer w.o.p., that is Θ(κ).
As a result, Algorand’s communication complexity is bnΘ(κ)+ nΩα(κ) and its
latency ∆O(1).
5 Discussion
Table 1 summarizes the different results for the studied protocols. These clearly out-
line the different styles of algorithms that required different methodologies in Section
4. Pure Blockchain style algorithms are the most efficient regarding communication
complexity. Their cost is even optimal in a sense, because bn bits are required to make
the messages known, and some (worst case) overhead due to byzantine nodes seems
unavoidable. On the other hand, we can see that their latency suffers from their security
parameter, which itself may be an unbounded function of the network parameters.
We see that Algorand stands out in this table, because it is the only one whose la-
tency does not depend on κ , but their bit complexity does. This is easily understandable
in the fact that blocks in Algorand are final and that no fork can occur. Intuitively, we
can see Algorand as doing all the random picking of participants in parallel, at the same
time, instead of sequentially.
Blockchain communication complexity It may be surprising that blockchain protocols
have such low communication cost compared to traditional O(n3) algorithms. This can
be explained by the fact that blockchain style algorithms share a common component:
public, unbiased randomness. Note that, for instance, the hash of a block is indeed
a public random, but not unbiasable, because the adversary is able to contribute to the
input of the hash, thus allowing her to make the random value suits her needs. This com-
ponent is needed to leverage an important mechanism of blockchain protocols: Within
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a random sample of the protocol participants, each node has a probability α < 1 of
being malicious. Therefore, by repeatedly taking nodes at random, the total number of
malicious nodes can be bounded w.o.p. This way, a finite number of unreliable broad-
casts can be sufficient to reach agreement with high probability, hence the probabilistic
safety.
Impact on the meaning of permissioned/permissionless Permissioned and permission-
less are terms that are well understood informally, but their precise meaning can be
problematic. Indeed, even if ”being able to join the system at any moment” is somewhat
clear, deciding whether a given algorithm is permissionless is arguably arbitrary. This
is due to a possible argument that a simple transformation could relax any permissioned
algorithm into a permissionless one. Indeed, in a permissioned setting, nodes are de-
termined and can be given arbitrary weights (i.e. having nodes count as multiple ones),
thus translating the fault tolerance to a fraction of the total weight. Then, defining the
weights as the nodes stake recorded in the blockchain itself, we should obtain a legiti-
mate PoS protocol. This transformation has already been used as an argument in prac-
tice [27]. Moreover, the inverse transformation (from permissionless to permissioned)
being also trivial, it would seem that the distinction permissioned/permissionless would
be more specific to the usage of the algorithm rather than the algorithm itself. However,
this seems to be false in practice, as algorithms are de facto targeted towards a specific
setting.
Our work allow for an answer to this issue. In our sense, we say that an algorithm
is suitable for the permissionless setting if it is scalable and stay efficient even with a
very high number of participants. In our opinion, it should have a bit complexity linear
in n, and a latency independent from n. We notice that Pass & Shi [28] proposed a
definition from permissionless environments, in which they formally define a model
were executions are permissionless/permissioned. In that sense, our statement is not
a definition of a permissionless environment in itself, but a criteria for categorizing
algorithms as suited to the permissionless setting or not.
6 Conclusion
In this work, a wide range of popular blockchain protocols was analyzed. Our metrics
and methodology has been carefully tuned to accurately describe the behavior of each
protocol.
We showed that, when considered as variants of Total Order Broadcast protocols,
permissionless blockchain protocols had a very efficient network usage, but were suffer-
ing latency-wise from their security parameter. This work also can be used as a ground
methodology to assess new protocols performances. Finally we discussed some impacts
of these results on the classification of permissioned and permissionless algorithms.
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